Fyodor Dostoyevsky
Publisher: Penguin Classics (2003)

Let us assume, for example, that I suffer deeply - yet I mean, another person would never be able to perceive the degree to which I suffer, because he is another person, and not me, and on top of that it's seldom that a person will agree to recognize another as a sufferer (as thought it were some kind of rank). Why won't he agree to it, do you suppose? Because, for example, I smell bad, or have a stupid expression on my face, or because I once trod on his toes. What's more, there is suffering and suffering: degrading suffering that degrades me - hunger, for example - is something that my benefactor will permit in me, but let the suffering be of ever such a slightly loftier sort, such as for an idea, for example, then no, only in very rare cases will he permit that, because he may, for example, look at me and suddenly perceive that the expression on my face is not at all like the one his fantasy supposes ought to be on the face of someone who is suffering for an idea. So he then at once deprives me of his beneficent deeds, though he does so not at all from any rancour of heart.